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Abstract
A new complex network model, called q-snapback network, is introduced. Basic
topological characteristics of the network, such as degree distribution, average path
length, clustering coefficient and Pearson correlation coefficient, are evaluated. The typ-
ical 4-motifs of the network are simulated. The robustness of both state and structural
controllabilities of the network against targeted and random node- and edge-removal
attacks, with comparisons to the multiplex congruence network and the generic scale-
free network, are presented. It is shown that the q-snapback network has the strongest
robustness of controllabilities due to its advantageous inherent structure with many
chain- and loop-motifs.
1 Introduction
The subject of complex networks has gained popularity after two decades of research pursuits
with great efforts from various scientific and engineering communities through intensive and exten-
sive studies, and has literally become a self-contained discipline interconnecting network science,
systems engineering, statistical physics, applied mathematics and social sciences [1, 2, 3].
This interdisciplinary research area, the interaction between network science and control sys-
tems theory in particular, has seen very rapid growth since year 2002 [4, 5, 6, 7]. In fact, it has
created a corpus of new opportunities and yet also great challenges for classical control and sys-
tems theories and technologies, since a complex dynamical network typically has large numbers of
nodes and edges, with higher-dimensional dynamical node-systems interconnected in a complicated
structure such as random, small-world or scale-free topology. For a complex dynamical network,
to achieve an optimal objective, practically one can only control a small fraction of nodes and/or
edges via external inputs. These observation and demand had motivated the long-term endeavor
and development of the so-called “pinning control” strategy [7], as a practical control approach to
addressing the fundamental questions of how many and which nodes to pin (to control), aiming to
design effective control algorithms that could “pull one hair to move the whole body”.
For a single-input/single-output (SISO) connected and directed framework of linear time-
invariant (LTI) node-systems, the minimum number of external inputs (controllers) required for
the network to be structurally controllable is determined by a criterion based on maximum match-
ing. The “minimum inputs theorem” [8] states that, if a network of size N has a perfect matching
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then the number of external controllers is ND = 1 and the controller can be pinned at any node;
otherwise, ND = N − |E∗| , where |E∗| is the number of elements in a maximum matching E∗,
and the controllers should be pinned at the unmatched nodes.
In the multi-input/multi-output (MIMO) setting, the state controllability of a connected, di-
rected and weighted network of LTI node-systems were studied in [9, 10], where it shows how the
network topology, node dynamics, external control inputs, and inner interactions altogether affect
the state controllability of the network, with necessary and sufficient conditions derived for the
controllability of a connected, directed and weighted network in a general topology. In [9, 10],
precise necessary and sufficient conditions are given in terms of the node-system matrices, control
gains and the network connectivity matrices. Then, some easily-verified formulas were derived in
[11] for verifying the necessary and sufficient controllability conditions for networked MIMO LTI
node-systems. Moreover, both state and structural controllabilities for temporal networks, namely
the about MIMO LTI setting with a certain time-varying network structure, were studied in [12],
establishing some necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the network controllability. Further-
more, in [13], conditions and methods were developed for designing the control input matrices of
pinning controllers to guarantee the network state and structural controllabilities.
In retrospect, there had been significant progress in the studies of network controllability in
the past decade [4]-[27] These studies were concerned with, for example, pinning small unmatched
nodes [14], optimizing the network controllability [15], identifying critical nodes for controllability
[16], investigating the exact controllability [17], finding the importance of in- and out-degrees for
control [18], and designing targeted control [19]. More recently, studies have evolved to consider-
ing, for instance, mathematical and computational approaches to controlling nonlinear networks
[20], control properties of complex networks [21], control energy issue [22], sensor-actuator place-
ments for network controllability [23], human protein-protein interaction network [24], structural
controllability of temporal networks [25], turning physically uncontrollable networks to become
controllable ones [26], and so on. Other related works on network controllability can be found
from the recent review articles [4], [28].
On the other hand, the issue of network robustness has been extensively investigated by different
means under different criteria in different settings, and there is a vast volume of literature on the
subject. Concerning the robustness of the controllability of a complex network against node and/or
edge removals, which typically cause cascading failures [29, 30], so that the network could retain
its connectivity and functionality (here, the network controllability), relevant research includes the
following. In [31], the normalized average edge betweenness is used as a measure of the network
vulnerability; in [32], a hybrid method combining similarity-based index and edge-betweenness
centrality is proposed for identifying and removing spurious interactions, keeping the network
connectivity and preserving the network functionality; in [33], it investigates the vulnerability of
complex networks subject to path-based attacks, showing that the more homogeneous the degree
distribution is, the more fragile the network will be. Particularly related to the present concern on
the network controllability, in [34] the vulnerability of network controllability is considered, where
the attacks are based on node degrees or edge betweenness, with simulations showing that the node-
based attacks are more harmful to the network controllability than the edge-based attacks and that
heterogeneous networks are more vulnerable than homogeneous ones; it was found, however, that
for many real-world networks the betweenness-based attacks are actually most harmful to the
network controllability.
A piece of recent theoretical work on network controllability and the corresponding robustness
is the initiation of a mathematical number-theoretic framework of complex network modeling and
analysis [35]. A congruence network is generated as follows. A link (edge) in the congruence
network is defined according to the congruence relation j ≡ r (mod i), where r is the reminder
of j divided by i, and they are all integers (here, natural numbers). For every fixed r, an infinite
set of natural number pairs (i, j) can be generated. For each pair of such integers, a directed link
from i to j (i < j) characterizes the congruence relation between them. For each r, this process
yields a congruence network associated with the reminder r, denote by G(r, N), where N is the
largest natural number in the present construction of the network. Then, for different values of r
(r ≤ N), one obtains various such networks, referred to as multiplex congruence networks (MCN).
It was found that every MCN is precisely a scale-free network with a power-law distribution for
out-degrees [35].
From the construction of an MCN, one can see that it contains many chains, where as usual
every chain has a root-node. Therefore, for each chain, using one external linear self-state feedback
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controller is sufficient to guarantees the controllability of the chain. Since typically r  N , the
controllability of the entire network is excellent, in the sense that a very small number of controllers
can guarantee the controllability of a large network. This is quite opposite to the common view
that scale-free networks are generally not good in controllability by requiring large numbers of
controllers because many small nodes need to be individually controlled in general. Moreover,
when a chain is being attacked, randomly or intentionally, with one node or one edge removed, in
the worst situation it is broken into two sub-chains. In this case, at most one new controller would
need to be added at the new chain-root in order to retain the controllability of the network, so it
is very robust against attacks. This is also quite opposite to the common view that a scale-free
network is fragile against intentional attacks.
The above interesting findings have stimulated our curiosity about the network controllability
and its robustness against attacks, urging us to find out why, how, and what the key factors are
behind the surprising phenomena regarding the controllability and its robustness against malicious
attacks for general complex dynamical networks. In this paper, we attempt to modify and extend
the multi-chain structure of the MCN to a multi-ring structure, thereby proposing a new q-snapback
network model, which will be shown to be superb in the robustness of network controllability.
Extensive simulation results indeed demonstrate that q-snapback networks and MCN outperform
general scale-free networks in resisting both targeted and random attacks, and also demonstrate
that the q-snapback network is prominently more robust than the MCN against targeted attacks
on the nodes with largest betweenness, and also against random attacks. The q-snapback network
has similar robustness as the MCN when the targeted attack aims at removing highest degree
nodes.
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new network model based on the
novel idea of using snapback connections, which turned out to be a good model with the strongest
robustness of network controllability against both targeted and random node/edge removal attacks.
One technical challenge was to reveal and confirm the key network sub-structures that affect the
controllability robustness of the new network model, which were found to be the relatively large
numbers of chains and loops existing in the new model, which are not prominent in other well-
known network models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the q-snapback network
model. Section 3 presents some analysis on the degree distribution of the new model. Section 4
shows simulation results on various topological features especially degree distributions and motifs.
Section 5 discusses both state and structural controllabilities and compares their robustness for
three types of networks, i.e., MCN, scale-free and q-snapback networks. Section 6 concludes the
investigation.
2 The q-snapback Network Model
Although both the MCN and generic scale-free networks have power-law degree distributions, they
behave oppositely against targeted and random attacks; namely, as is well known, generic scale-free
networks are robust against random attacks but fragile against targeted attacks, but in contrast
MCNs are robust against targeted but fragile against random attacks [35]. This suggests that the
power-law degree distribution is not the essential reason supporting the network robustness against
attacks and failures.
It is observed that an MCN contains many chains. Since each chain has one root, a subgraph
with r chains has at most r roots. According to the matching theory [8], to control a chain only
one controller is needed to pin at the root. The chain structure is robust against targeted attack
regarding the network controllability, since after one node-removal at most one more new controller
is needed to retain its controllability.
It is also observed that, although the structure of chains offers a good controllability to MCN,
these chains have feedforward loop connections. Practically, feedback loops are more common and
more useful than feedforward ones. For example, the industrial assembly-line illustrated by Fig. 1
is very common in manufacturing processes. On the other hand, the number-theoretic congruence
relation has no patterns and no analytic formulas to use for design and analysis considerations.
Therefore, a model with feedback connections (called snapback links) based on a uniform proba-
bility distribution is proposed.
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Figure 1: An example of assembly-line automation with a snapback connection structure, where
Pi represents the ith plant and Fj represents the jth feedback controller.
In the snapback network model: 1) the feedforward links are replaced by feedback links; 2) the
congruence relations are replaced by uniform random connections. Similarly to the MCN, the basic
structure of the new model is a backbone chain, which is a maximum matching with all matched
nodes except the root. The main difference of the new model compared with the MCN model lies
in its large number of loops, which turns out to be advantageous for the controllability robustness
as further discussed later below.
More precisely, the q-snapback network consists of multiple layers, generated as follows. Let
q ∈ [0, 1] be a probability parameter. Each layer starts with a directed chain, which will be the
backbone of the connected layer. Then, following some rules a number of snapback links are
generated connecting to the chain with probability q. Finally, all layers are stacked together as a
whole network, where the same nodes will merge into a single node and the same links will also
merge into a single link, so as to avoid multiple nodes and multiple links.
Specifically, start from a directed chain with nodes 1, 2, ..., N .
For r = 1, process as follows to generate the first layer network. For every node i = 2, 3, 4, ..., N ,
it connects backward to all previously-appeared nodes i − 1, i − 2, ..., 2, 1, all with a (same and
small) probability q ∈ [0, 1]. As a result, some will be backward connected but some will not,
which happens at random uniformly.
For r = 2, continue to process in the same way but it connects backward to only some (not
all) previously-appeared nodes, i.e., for nodes i = 3, 4, ..., N , they backward connect to nodes
i− 2, i− 4, ..., i− 2b i2c, with the same probability q ∈ [0, 1] uniformly. In notation, if i− 2b i2c = 0,
then the link (i, i− 2b i2c) will not exist.
Next, the construction continues similarly. For the rth layer of the network, with r = 3, 4, 5, ..., N−
1, the nodes i = r + 1, r + 2, ..., N will backward connect to nodes i − r, i − 2r, ..., i − rb ir c, with
the same probability q ∈ [0, 1] uniformly. Denoted it as Gr(q,N).
The above procedure continues, until it cannot be processed any further.
Finally, stack all so-generated layers together into one, thus establishing the final multiplex
network, denoted as G(q,N) =
⋃N−1
r=1 Gr(q,N), called the q-snapback multiplex network of size
N .
Fig. 2 shows the pseudo codes for generating a q-snapback network. The input parameters
include the network size N and the probability of adding snapback links, q ∈ [0, 1]. Note that,
with q = 0, it is the original chain without any backward connection; with q = 1, it is a maximum-
size snapback network having the largest number of backward connections.
For each layer, there is a directed chain with some numbers of backward connections. As
described above, with r = 1, the backward connections on layer G1 are generated as follows: For
every node i = 2, 3, 4, ..., N , connect it backward to previously-existing nodes i−1, i−2, i−3, ..., 2, 1,
all with the same probability q. For this case of r = 1, the generated layer is the densest one,
with the largest number of links. On the contrary, with r = N − 1, there will be only one possible
backward connection on the chain, i.e., only node i = N could possibly be connected backward to
the first node, which is the sparsest layer (the (N−1)st layer).
Each layer can work separately and independently, since it is built on the backbone. Also, all
the layers can be stacked together so as to form a multiplex network. Note that all the repeated
nodes and links are removed when the layers are put together as one whole network, avoiding
multiple nodes and links. Fig. 3 shows an example of stacking two layers together, which has two
types of repeated links: 1) the backbone directed links from i to i+ 1, for i = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, and
2) the repeated backward links. As can be seen from the figure, the resultant q-snapback network
is an ensemble of links from the two layers without multiple nodes and links.
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 Input: 1) network size 𝑁;  2) probability of adding a snapback 
link 𝑞  
Start from a directed chain 𝐺0 with 𝑁 nodes and 𝑁 − 1 directed 
links, directing from 𝑖 to 𝑖 + 1 (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 − 1).  
For 𝑟: = 1 to 𝑁 − 1  
/* This step generates the 𝑟-th layer 𝐺𝑟(𝑞, 𝑁) */ 
𝐺𝑟: = 𝐺0    /* The backbone of each layer */ 
Generate backward connections on 𝐺𝑟  as follows: For 
every node 𝑖 = 𝑟 + 1, 𝑟 + 2,… , 𝑁, connect it backward 
to nodes 𝑖 − 𝑟 ∙ 𝑙, (𝑙 = 1, 2,… , ⌊
𝑖
𝑟
⌋), with the same 
probability 𝑞;   
End for 
Put all the 𝑁 − 1 layers together, and remove repeated 
nodes and links. 
Output: 1) q-snapback network 𝐺(𝑞, 𝑁); 2) single layers 
𝐺𝑟(𝑞, 𝑁) 
Figure 2: Pseudo codes for generating a q-snapback multiplex network.
Figure 3: A two-layer example of the q-snapback multiplex network. Each layer is a connected
subnetwork and their backbone structures are the same directed chain. On both the 1st and 2nd
layers, there is a link connecting from node 6 back to node 4. When stacking them together in the
integrated multiplex network, only one link from node 6 to node 4 is kept. The situation for the
other nodes is similar.
3 Analysis on Degree Distributions
In this section, degree distribution of the q-snapback network is derived analytically. Here, the
out-degrees and in-degrees of a directed network are both considered. First, the degree distribution
of each single layer is discussed, followed by the multiplex network.
3.1 Single layers
For the rth layer, r = 1, · · · , N−1, the out-degree of the ith node dO(i), i = 1, 2, ..., N , is calculated
by
dO(i) =

1, for i = 1, 2, ..., r
1 + b i−1r c · q, for i = r + 1, ..., N − 1
b i−1r c · q, for i = N
(1)
where bxc is the floor function that returns the greatest integer less than or equal to x.
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Figure 4: Illustration of a snapback link from any node i to any node j (j < i) in a q-snapback
network.
Similarly, the in-degree of the ith node dI(i), i = 1, 2, ..., N , is
dI(i) =

bN−1r c · q, for i = 1
1 + bN−ir c · q, for i = 2, ..., N − r
1, for i = N − r + 1, ..., N
(2)
where bxc is the floor function.
3.2 The multiplex q-snapback network
When a number of layers are stacked together, the multiplex network is formed. As shown in
Fig. 4, for any node i, its out-degree is
dMO (i) =

1, for i = 1
1 +
∑i−1
j=1 Ii,jq, for i = 2, 3, ..., N − 1∑N−1
j=1 Ii,jq, for i = N
(3)
where
Ii,j =
{
1, if there exists an edge (i, j)
0, otherwise
(4)
Similarly, the in-degree of the ith node is
dMI (i) =

∑N
j=2 Ii,jq, for i = 1
1 +
∑N
j=i+1 Ii,jq, for i = 2, 3, ..., N − 1
1 for i = N
(5)
where Ii,j is defined in (4).
An edge (i, j) could appear on different layers, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The probability that the
edge (i, j) exists on at least one layer, i.e., the probability of existence of edge (i, j), is given by
P(i,j) = 1− (1− q)
∏m
i=1 (xi+1) (6)
where i − j = ax11 ·ax22 . . .axmm , with a1, a2, ..., am being prime numbers, and (1 − q)
∏m
i=1 (xi+1) rep-
resents the probability that edge (i, j) does not exist on any layer of the multiplex network. Here,
1 means 10.
4 Simulations
Extensive simulations had been performed on the q-snapback network of size N = 104, with q = 0.1
unless otherwise indicated. The following statistical results are averages over 50 independent runs.
It was found that:
1) the average path length is 1667.6, with a standard deviation 0.0;
2) the clustering coefficient is 0.4679, with a standard deviation 6.4× 10−5;
3) the Pearson correlation coefficient (i.e., assortativity) is −0.4979, with a standard deviation
1.1× 10−4.
Next, the out-degree distributions of some single layers Gr(q = 0.1, N = 104), and of the
multiplex network G(q = 0.1, N = 104), are simulated. Here, only the simulation results on the
out-degree distributions are shown, for brevity, since the in-degree distributions (2) and (5) have
similar forms as the out-degree ones (1) and (3). Moreover, the influence of the parameter q on
the degree distribution of the multiplex network is shown and analyzed. Finally, the distribution
of the 4-motifs on the multiplex network is simulated and discussed.
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Figure 5: Degree distributions of different single layers. The blue pluses (+) are simulation results
and the red lines are calculated using equation (1): (a) layer r = 1; (b) layer r = 2; (c) layer r = 3;
(d) layer r = 5; (e) layer r = 10; (f) layer r = 100; (g) layer r = 200; (h) layer r = 500; (i) layer
r = 1, 000.
4.1 Out-degree distributions of single layers
Fig. 5 shows the degree distribution of 9 single layers of a multiplex q-snapback network. For each
single layer, the degree distribution is uniform. The tails of the distribution curves in the figures
are due to the well-known finite-size effects. Both empirical and analytical results are presented in
the figures. The empirical simulation results (presented by blue pluses in the figures) are averages
over 50 independent runs, while the red lines are the analytical solutions calculated by equation
(1) for reference.
4.2 Out-degree distribution of the multiplex network
Fig. 6 shows the degree distribution of the multiplex q-snapback network. As can be seen from the
figure, the degree distribution is uniform, just like all the single layers, as expected. The analytical
degree distribution calculated by equation (3) is also plotted in Fig. 6, for reference. Note that
equation (3) gives the expectation of the out-degrees, which is a real number. When plotting Fig. 6,
for better visualization the real numbers are rounded to their nearest integers, thus the analytical
degree distribution curve appears to be three parallel lines.
4.3 Influence of probability q on degree distributions
Fig. 7 shows the influence of the probability parameter q on the degree distribution of the multiplex
network. As can be seen from the figure, the curve becomes more widely distributed as q increases,
but it still remains being uniform constantly. This means that uniform distribution is a scale-free
property (bigger value of q generates more edges) of the new model.
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Figure 6: The degree distribution of the multiplex q-snapback network. The blue pluses (+) are
simulation results and the red dots are calculated using equation (3), where real numbers are
rounded to their nearest integers thus the analytic curve appears to be three parallel lines.
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Figure 7: Degree distributions when q is 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 0.5 and 1.0, respectively.
4.4 Distribution of 4-motifs
Motifs contribute to and even determine many basic properties of a network, thereby becoming an
important object for investigation. The distribution of the 4-motifs in the multiplex q-snapback
network is shown in Fig. 8. There are 8 of 4-motifs as shown in Fig. 8 (a), labeled from A to H,
respectively. Motifs in other sizes are either trivial or too complicated therefore are not discussed
here. Fig. 8 (b) shows the distribution of each motif on the network G(q = 0.1, N = 10, 000). As
can be seen from the bar chat, the chains (motif type A) are the most frequently appearing motif,
followed by the loops (motif type D). In the next section, it will be shown that these two particular
4-motifs play key roles in the robustness of the network controllability.
5 Controllability
The controllability of the q-snapback network is studied through extensive simulations.
Recall [9] that a system or network described by x˙ = Ax + Bu, where A and B are constant
matrices of compatible dimensions, is state controllable if and only if the controllability matrix
[B AB A2B · · · , An−1B] has a full row-rank, where n is the dimension of A. The concept of
structural controllability is a slight generalization, dealing with two parameterized matrices A and
B, in which the parameters characterize the structure of the underlying system or network. If
there are specific parameter values that can make the two parameterized matrices become state
controllable, then the underlying system or network is structurally stable.
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Figure 8: Distribution of the 4-motifs: (a) notation of the eight 4-motifs; (b) comparison of
distributions of the eight 4-motifs on G(q = 0.1, N = 10, 000) and G(q = 0.3, N = 10, 000).
Table 1: Attack methods for simulation.
Node-removal Edge-removal
Targeted
TANB: to remove the node
with the largest betweenness
———————————–
TAND: to remove the node
with the largest degree
TAE
Random RAN RAE
The network controllability is measured by the density of the control-nodes nD, where nD ≡
ND/N and ND is the number of external controllers (also called driver nodes) needed to retain
the network controllability after the network had been attacked, and N is the network size. The
smaller the nD is, the more robust the network controllability will be.
The simulation design here is an extension of the multiplex congruence networks (MCN) sim-
ulations reported in [35]. Both MCN and scale-free (SF) networks are taken to compare with the
q-snapback network. Scaling property is examined by using two network sizes, with 100 nodes
and 1,000 nodes respectively. Five types of attacks, as shown in Table 1, are implemented, i.e.,
node-betweenness-based targeted attacks (TANB), node-degree-based targeted attacks (TAND),
node-based random attacks (RAN), edge-based targeted attacks (TAE), and edge-based random
attacks (RAE). Here, TAE aims at removing the edges with the largest edge-betweenness. To
reduce the effect of randomness, the results of node-based RA are averaged over 100 independent
runs, and that of edge-based RA are averaged over 30 independent runs. The detailed simulation
results are shown in Figs. 9, 10 and 11.
When the network size is set to N = 100, as did in [35], for comparison, the results are shown
in Figs. 9 (a) and (b). Because the degree distribution is deterministic for the MCN, in the case of
100 nodes it is 〈k〉 = 3.82 [35], the average degrees of the other two types of (SF and q-snapback)
networks are set to 〈k〉 ≈ 3.82 for a fair comparison, which means that they all have about the
same number of links. For SF networks, the average degree cannot be precisely controlled due to
the randomness in their generating processes, therefore fine-tunings are performed by adding or
deleting a few links, so as to slightly change the average degree such that the difference of average
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Figure 9: Density of control-nodes nD as a function of the proportion pN of removed nodes, where
nD represents the proportion of needed control-nodes over all nodes of the current network. TANB
represents the targeted attacks that aim at removing the node with the largest betweenness on
the current network: (a) Network size 100, state controllability; (b) network size 100, structural
controllability; (c) network size 1,000, state controllability; and (d) Network size 1,000, structural
controllability.
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Figure 10: Density of control-nodes nD as a function of the proportion pN of removed nodes.
TAND represents the targeted attacks that aim at removing the node with the largest out-degree
in the current network, where for same-degree nodes it randomly removes one. RAN represents the
random attacks that randomly remove a node from the current network: (a) Network size 1,000,
state controllability; and (b) network size 1,000, structural controllability.
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Figure 11: Density of control-nodes nD as a function of the proportion pE of removed edges. The
subscript E represents that both the targeted and random attacks aim at removing edges: (a)
Network size 100, state controllability; (b) network size 100, structural controllability; (c) network
size 1,000, state controllability; and (d) Network size 1,000, structural controllability.
degrees between SF and MCN networks becomes negligible. As for the q-snapback network, it
turns out that q = 0.06 is the best value to use, so G2(q = 0.06, N = 100) is generated, which
yields an average degree 〈k〉 = 3.78. As a result, q-snapback network is slightly sparsely linked as
compared to MCN and SF.
When the network size is set to N = 1, 000, the average degree for the three types of networks
is set to 〈k〉 ≈ 6.06. Similarly, MCN has 〈k〉 = 6.06, SF network has 〈k〉 ≈ 6.06 and the q-snapback
has 〈k〉 = 6.055; again, the q-snapback network is slightly sparser in terms of edge density in this
case.
Both state controllability and structural controllability of these networks are examined. Figs. 9
(a) and (c) show a comparison on the state controllability under TANB and RAN, respectively.
Both figures show the same phenomenon regardless of the changes of the network sizes. The SF
network is the most vulnerable to both TANB and RAN. The q-snapback network is the most
robust against these two types of attacks. Likewise, in the structural controllability comparison as
shown in Figs. 9 (b) and (d), the q-snapback network is the most robust against both TANB and
RAN.
When the target of the targeted-attacks is shifted, from node-betweenness (TANB) to node-
degree (TAND), the q-snapback network performs similarly to MCN. More precisely, as shown
in Fig. 10, MCN performs more robustly than q-snapback when pN < 0.544 (pN = 0.544 is
the intersection of the curves MCN-TAND and QSN-TAND in Fig. 10). This is because, by the
network construction and node-removal mechanisms, the node-degrees of the MCN are arranged
in decreasing order and the earlier node-based removals would not affect its connectivity, but after
some time its connectivity crashes rapidly. On the contrary, the node-degrees of the q-snapback
network are uniformly distributed, so its connectivity remains about the same against removals
even after the MCN became disconnected.
Both MCN and the q-snapback network outperform the SF network against the three types of
node-based attacks, essentially due to their inherent chain- and loop-motif structures.
Furthermore, simulation on an attack was performed on edge-removals, with results shown in
Fig. 11. This kind of attack removes edges from the network, one after another, either in the
targeting order or at random. Note that, when the network size is 1,000, there are more than six
11
thousand edges in each network (〈k〉 ≈ 6.06), thus the results of random edge-removal are averaged
over 30 independent runs. In this comparison, again, the q-snapback outperforms MCN and SF
prominently.
6 Conclusions
A new complex network model, named q-snapback network, has been introduced. Some basic
topological characteristics of the network have been calculated, including the degree distribu-
tion, average path length, clustering coefficient and Pearson correlation coefficient. The typical
4-motifs of the network have also been evaluated. Most importantly, the robustness of both state
controllability and structural controllability of the q-snapback network against five types of at-
tacks (i.e., targeted betweenness-based node-removal, targeted degree-based node-removal, ran-
dom node-removal, targeted edge-removal, and random edge-removal) have been simulated with
comparisons to the multiple congruence network and the generic scale-free network, showing that
the multiplex q-snapback network has the strongest robustness of both controllabilities due to its
rich inherent chain- and loop-motif structure. The finding reveals that, to build a network with
strong robustness of controllabilities against node- and/or -edge removal attacks, it is advantageous
to embed more chain- especially loop-microstructures. Whether or not such networks are also good
in data traffic management, multi-agent systems and industrial assembly-line automation, as well
as other networking performances, remains an important topic for future investigation.
Like the MCN, the q-snapback network has a backbone chain, which has advantage in robust-
ness but also has disadvantage as being less structurally flexible in modeling diverse real-world
networks. Looking forward, it is foreseeable that the new q-snapback network model not only
have potential applications in industrial assembly-line automation (Fig. 1), but also in biological
systems [24] and brain science [27] regarding its feedback control, controllability and information
transmission.
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